Statistics in the broad sense is about extracting information from data. The common view of statistics is much narrower, though. Often, it is seen only as a set of cookbook methods that are designed for small sets of data that are obtained according to a known design or sampling plan. The massive dynamic sets of data with tens or hundreds of gigabytes or even terabytes of data that are increasingly common in business, manufacturing, environmental sciences, astronomy, data networking and many other areas are felt to be beyond the domain of statistics. Moreover, the most visible challenges with massive data involve computing, which can lead to the view that data mining and other branches of computer science are more appropriate for massive data than statistics is. This paper, however, argues that statistics in the broad sense is essential for extracting information from really big sets of data and shows how statistics intersects with and complements computer science. An application to fraud detection is used to illustrate the ideas.
What is Statistics?
Most people are rst exposed to statistics in a required undergraduate course that is lled with a hundred or more other students who are also required to be there. Partially in response to demands from other departments, the introductory course focuses on traditional methods for the kinds of small experiments, studies and surveys that are part of the curriculum for other departments. Typically, nearly all, if not all, the datasets considered have fewer than 100 observations with only a few variables on each, and the objective is to apply simple methods for nding means, variances, p-values and linear regression models. There is no discussion of computing, probably both for lack of time and because sophisticated computing is not needed. There is some discussion of mathematical properties of techniques, but usually not in terms that are intuitive. Inference centers on con dence intervals and p-values, which are simple to compute but subtle to explain. What most people take away from the course is that statistics is neither particularly hard nor interesting (except for some peculiar use of language), it is only useful for simple data and simple questions (if at all), and any one can apply it (although it is best avoided), but hardly anyone can understand it.
But statistics is much di erent, and not just broader or deeper, from what is taught in undergraduate courses. Simply stated, statistics is about extracting information from data that are noisy or uncertain. The unstated position is that all data are noisy. Twenty measurements from a small experiment are noisy, and zillions of transaction records in a data warehouse are noisy. The data may represent a process (like purchasing behavior) that varies across people and from one transaction to the next, even for the same individual. The data may have errors or be incomplete (even in the U.S. Census). Or, the goal may be prediction, so the available data are only a noisy representation of data to come. Statistics, then, is about overcoming the uncertainty and noise in the data to reveal the information hidden within.
Statisticians take on many roles in order to either work with others to understand their data or to produce tools and methods for understanding data. Some design graphics, introducing ways to visualize data to bring out the structure of both the random and nonrandom components. An introduction to data visualization from the perspective of a statistician is given in 19], 9] and 10]. A system for interactive, dynamic data visualization for the purpose of statistical analysis is discussed in 16]). Statisticians have also designed exible programming environments for exploring, analyzing and visualizing data. Two popular environments are S 4] and Lisp- Stat 18] . The 1999 ACM Software Systems Award was given to S because it \ : : : has forever altered how we analyze, visualize and manipulate data." Recently, a global collaboration has begun to build a statistical computing environment called Omega that is based on distributed components ( 5] and 17]).
Many (most?) statisticians spend at least some time working with data, breaking it down into random and deterministic components. Usually, the rst step is informal. The data are plotted in many di erent ways { smoothing, transforming, and selecting di erent views each time { to discover patterns and structure informally. Then those patterns are set aside, often by subtraction, and the residuals are examined visually in many di erent ways to reveal any remaining structure or patterns in the data. Then that structure is subtracted, and the t and set aside structure steps are repeated on the new residuals, on and on (with some backstepping) until no structure can be found. In this way, a statistical model is built.
The basic statistical model is simply data = mean + noise;
but both the mean and the noise can be complicated. The mean might be linear, nonlinear, additive, multiplicative, nonparametric, a step function (as in a tree), an assignment function (as in classi cation or clustering) or smooth as a function of a set of explanatory variables. The noise describes the variation in the data, which a ects prediction and reliability of estimates. The noise might be independently normal, correlated, long-tailed, weighted to account for nonrandom sampling, length-biased, spatial, or hierarchically structured, for example. Often the noise does not a ect the data additively, so a more appropriate model is data F mean(data) = g( );
where F is a distribution that describes the variability of the data. Again, F can be a well-known distribution like the Bernoulli, it can include correlation between observations, mixing to allow possible outliers, weighting to account for non-random (but probabilistic) sampling and length biasing and on and on. Many kinds of models are possible, each representing both the structure and variation in the data. The more complicated the process that generated the data, the more complicated the statistical model may need to be. The basic premise that drives much of statistics, though, is that modeling the noise component well is as important as modeling the mean structure well. The noise component is needed for prediction, to understand what is likely and what is not. It is also needed to understand how reliable the estimated mean or prediction is. Using a deterministic model for a mean without some sense of its reliability is felt to be downright dangerous. Although the range and nature of statistical models can seem bewildering to nonstatisticians, a wealth of models is crucial for representing data when the goal is reliable inference or prediction.
Most statisticians have not dealt with massive data, though. Most do not have the necessary computing or database management skills; their skills lie elsewhere. Part of the intention of this paper is to encourage both computer scientists and statisticians to collaborate. Section 2 describes what a statistician sees when looking at how massive data are analyzed. Section 3 then takes a closer look at fraud detection, which is a problem that has been tackled by many people in the data mining community. Section 4 o ers nal thoughts on the role of statistics and its interactions with computer science.
Massive Data
Statisticians nd models a natural way to think about data, but not everyone looks at data that way. Another view holds that the data in a database are not random or uncertain but an accounting of everything that has happened. Thus, the need is not to make inferences about an underlying process that is observed imprecisely. Instead, the need is to process the data Statistics might then be used to approximate answers to queries that in principle can be known exactly, given enough computing power and time, but in practice are too costly to obtain. (See, for example, 14].) From this perspective, the numbers computed from the entire database have no uncertainty and are useful mainly for accounting. How much was spent last month? How many people bought that product? How many people bought those two products in Florida last weekend? If all the data cannot be processed to answer the questions of interest, then the data can be sampled (not necessarily randomly) and knowledge of the sampling scheme can be used to derive bounds on the errors of the approximate answer. Or, the data can be processed in blocks that are combined sequentially, and knowledge of the properties of the block estimates and the sequential estimation scheme can be combined to provide probabilistic error bounds.
While approximating answers that would be obtained given su cient computing resources is enough for many purposes, it is not enough when the unit of analysis is small and the answer cannot be computed from the data with certainty, even if all the data are analyzed. Will this customer churn? Did this customer experience fraud last month? How much will be spent on those two products in Florida next weekend? Those questions cannot be answered with certainty, and are the sort that interest statisticians.
Experience obviously a ects the approach that people take to analyzing data. Many of the people who do not think in terms of statistical models work mainly with massive sets of data that were not collected for the purposes of statistical analysis. The Palomar Observatory Sky Survey has several terabytes of data and was collected to classify stellar objects 12] . A data warehouse of local call records for a competitive local exchange carrier grows by about 200 million calls per day and is used for billing and in certain legal cases. The packet headers for a network of 1000 IP addresses ll 2 gigabytes each day. Routine measurements on wafer fabrication on one line at one plant ll a gigabyte per day. Many of these applications are dynamic, so the data keep accumulating. Moreover, the problems of interest keep changing. Most of these examples are not the result of designed studies, but rather an e ort to collect \all the data."
Obviously, data management is a huge challenge for a massive set of data. Even seemingly simple questions, such as should the data be kept in one huge warehouse or in several distributed databases, can set o heated discussions. Processing to compute even simple summaries can be slow and cumbersome. Data cleaning or checking for errors and missing data is di cult to automate, or even formulate in a way that can be acted on. The most common statistical analysis programs and packages require all the data to be read into main memory, but it may not be possible to read all the summary parameters for a big dataset into memory, never mind the raw data themselves. Database management systems are better able to handle the volume of data, but they usually have only rudimentary analysis capabilities.
Processing massive data is so di cult that it can overshadow the analysis. In the rst paragraph of the foreward to Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Wiederhold 20] 
writes
Finding new phenomena or enhancing our knowledge about them has a greater long-range value than optimizing production processes or inventories and is second only to tasks that preserve our world and our environment. It is not surprising that it is also one of the most di cult computing challenges to do well.
This quote often takes statisticians by surprise, not because they believe that computing is easy but because it suggests nding structure in data is merely a matter of algorithms or memory or processing power or the right database management system, and that the traditional analysis issues, such as taking context and the structure of the noise in the data into account, are not an issue.
But some of the traditional problems that arise when analyzing smaller sets of data are surprisingly hard for massive data. For example, visualizing the complexities of massive data is challenging. In principle, it is possible to use interactive graphics to drill down and brush across data, but drilling down and moving across a tangle of web-based reports can be overwhelmingly frustrating and confusing, even if the number of points plotted in any one view is not too large. Modeling the data is di cult, not only because computations are slow but also because the data often have complex hierarchies, multiple levels of variability, unknown errors and gaps, and unknown selection biases. The problems that arise are nonstandard. The usual metrics for measuring success are often irrelevant, and new ones may not have been examined in depth. In other words, looking at the data is hard, structuring the problem to be solved is hard, solving it is hard, and then knowing how well it has been solved is hard (and, of course, processing the data is hard, too).
For example, the data may consist of log les of visits to a website, and the goal may be to analyze the useability of the website. The simplest approach is to tally the data, counting page hits broken down by time period or geography or referral engine, for example. This does not re ect how people are using the website, though. Useability requires monitoring how a user traverses pages at the site, and how the user changes when the website is revisited. Does a new visitor keep returning to the home page, perhaps because starting over seems the only way to get to the relevant location? Do people look at one page brie y and then leave the site? Do people who are referred from one search engine browse di erently from people who access the site from a di erent search engine? Do people who visit a site frequently di er from those who visit once? These questions require thinking of the visitor as the unit of measurement, not the page hit. This leads to thorny questions, such as what is a visit? Understanding the bias in the data is also important. Which visitors are of interest? If uninteresting visitors dominate the data, then treating all visitors equally introduces bias and can produce misleading analyses. For example, the fact that most people look at the home page and then leave may be important, but keeping them in all stages of the analysis may only obscure how the website is used by those who use it at all. Identifying the interesting visitors is di cult not just because there are many visitors to consider but also because \interesting" is a hidden label that has to be deduced by considering many visitors, not just one visitor at a time. Also, what is interesting evolves so the rules for labeling a visitor as interesting have to evolve. Finally, ignoring the tree structure of the pages and the path the visitor takes through that tree can easily produce misleading results.
The rst step in any statistical analysis is to look at the data in innumerable ways. Visualizing the behavior of visitors at a website in a way that respects the structure of the data is di cult, but some progress has been made. For example, Mark Hansen and Wim Sweldens of Bell Labs have introduced synchronized browsing, which allows a content provider to browse web pages and simultaneously see the results of analyses, tying the structure of the analysis to the structure of the website. As the content provider clicks through the website, analysis results on visitors to the page, such as where they came from, what they did on the page, how long they stayed, and where they went next, are displayed. This gives an informal sense of the structure of the data that can hint at more formal models of the \average" or \typical" way the website is used and how variable users are.
Although there is a massive amount of data in a log le, we may still be data-poor when the dynamic tree structure of the data is taken into account. There are many more ways to traverse a tree than there are visitors. Still, if a statistical model can be used to describe a visit, then it is possible to make inferences about paths that are never observed. Even if a complete path has never been observed, visitors may have used parts of the path. With a probability model, the data can be used to estimate probabilities of the partial paths and to combine the probabilities of the partial paths to estimate the probability of a complete, unobserved path.
Traditional data mining problems like clustering users or pages are also of interest, but even these can be much richer than often assumed. For example, the goal may be to understand how the behaviors of customer segments are changing and how the changes relate to changes in the website. In that case, a static measure of performance such as an overall misclassi cation rate that is applied to give one summary of performance can be seriously wrong about current performance. Often good performance measures cannot be developed at all without close collaboration with subject matter experts who understand the context of the problem.
The fact that it is dangerous to analyze data without knowledge of the context has been underscored by many people involved in data mining and statistics. But it is worth repeating because ignoring it leads to silliness which can discredit all of data analysis and mining. An April 1998 article in Forbes entitled \Diaper-Beer Syndrome" gives a long list of failed attempts to build data warehouses for data mining and an equally long list of unrealistic claims, including some that grew out of the often-cited case that found a correlation between buying beer and diapers in one store in early evening hours. Several of the papers in 11] also emphasize that a set of general tools applied in a vacuum without taking the context into account are likely to lead to useless results (for example, 1] and 8]).
Has statistics had any success in analyzing massive data? The rest of this paper considers that question in the context of fraud detection, a topic that has previously been discussed in the data mining/knowledge discovery literature (e.g, 2] and 13]). More information on our approach and other approaches to fraud detection is given in 3].
3 Statistical Fraud Detection
Describing Account Variability
Our goal is a system for detecting telecommunications fraud as it is happens, whether it is calling card fraud, in which a stolen credit card is used to place a call, wireless fraud, in which a cellular phone may have been cloned, wireline fraud, in which a hacker may break into a PBX, or subscription fraud, in which a customer initiates service without intending to pay. \As it happens" means that each call is scored for fraud either while it is active or as soon as it is ended { not at the end of an arbitrary monitoring or analysis period, such as midnight each day. Of course, one call alone is usually insu cient to detect fraud, so scored calls have to be combined into an account score to detect fraud. The rst step, though, is to score calls in nearly real-time.
If we could predict a caller's next call precisely, then it would be easy to detect the kinds of fraud in which someone in ltrates an account. We would only have to compare the observed call with the predicted call for the legitimate user. Detecting subscription fraud, in which a customer never intends to pay for any calls on a newly opened account, would also be easy, if we could predict the activity on a legitimate account precisely and the predicted activity on a legitimate account were di erent from the activity in an account with subscription fraud. But calling behavior cannot be predicted without uncertainty, so the natural alternative is to consider probabilistic prediction. That is, our approach is to predict legitimate calling behavior for each customer and score the customer's calls against that distribution. This means that di erent standards are applied to each account to detect fraud, because what would be common for one customer is rare for another. Note that the variability in the calling pattern is what determines whether a call is unusual, so fraud detection is as much about describing customer-speci c noise as it is about describing customer-speci c structure.
There are many reasons why scoring calls is di cult. First, there are many, many calls, and scoring must be fast enough to keep up with the data ow. So any score must be simple to compute and any prediction model must be simple to apply and maintain. Second, there can be millions of customers, and scoring must take into account the behavior of any legitimate caller. Third, the customer base is often volatile. New customers make calls each day, and the fraction of fraud is often higher for new accounts than established accounts. \Casual callers" use an access code to place a call on a network on which they have not established an account. Casual dialers also have higher fraud rates than established customers. Thus, call and account scoring must be useful for new customers and casual dialers at their initial calls. Finally, the prediction model has to adapt as more is learned about the customer, without intervention or o -line processing and without tracking fraud.
From a statistical perspective, a customer's legitimate calling behavior can be represented by a probability distribution over the properties of the next call.
These properties can be written as X = (X 1 ; : : : ; X k ), representing factors such as call duration, call timing (day-of-week or hour-of-day), call rate, geography of the called number (hierarchically organized by country, region, city, exchange, for example), payment method (coin phone, calling card, bill-to-third-number, pre-pay or none), and other information that can be gleaned from a calling record. A legitimate caller i at the time of its call n has a distribution C i;n on X i;n . A fraudster has a, hopefully di erent, distribution F. The distributions C i;n and F are high-dimensional, with possibly complex interactions among the variables. For example, the duration of calls may depend on the termination and the time-of-day, so considering only the one-dimensional, marginal distribution of calls would be misleading. In any case, the statistical problem is to score a call according to whether it is more likely to be fraud (have come from F) or be legitimate (have come from C i;n ), where both distributions may be complicated.
Signatures: Estimated Account Activity
A major di culty is that the probability distributions that the estimated probability distribution is good for predicting the calling behavior for most customers and misleading for at most a small fraction of customers.
There are many types of nonparametric estimates that might be used to estimate calling distributions. A simple choice that is based on a variant of standard histograms (an array of cells and corresponding relative frequencies) is described in 7] . Histograms are useful for many di erent sorts of distributions, unlike moment based summaries such as means and variances. Either equi-depth ( xed probability) histograms with variable endpoints for the cells or xed cells with variable relative frequencies can be used. But in either case, using the same structure for each customer simpli es processing. Choosing that structure is an exercise in massive model selection, where selection involves rst choosing bin de nitions (probabilities for xed depth histograms and bin de nitions otherwise) and then choosing the conditional distributions that are to be kept for all customers. (For example, durations of peak and nonpeak calls might be monitored separately.)
In other words, the full model for customer i is the estimated distribution of (X i;1 ; : : : ; X i;k ) with all possible dependencies, and the goal is to represent that distribution by a more parsimonious one that ignores some of the dependencies but is su cient to represent the caller's pattern of behavior. The \only" complication is that the same set of dependencies has to be used for all customers to simplify processing.
An approach to selecting a structure for the C i;n s based on statistical testing is described in 7] . This method assumes that there is a set of \clean" historical data on tens or hundreds of thousands of customers over several months, where clean means that the customers experienced no fraud during the period or had so little fraud that neither the customer nor the service provider detected it. Thus, this set of historical data represents legitimate behavior. There is also a much smaller set of data on customers that experienced fraud, although often the fraudulent and non-fraudulent calls are not labelled by the service provider. A variant of KullbackLeibler distance can be applied to the historical data to set bin de nitions, to maximize the discrimination of fraud from non-fraud. A 2 test can be applied to each customer separately, and the interactions or multivariate dependencies that are needed (according to the test) to represent the distributions of a su cient fraction of customers are retained. Over tting is not a problem with this approach, because the data on each customer is relatively sparse. We call the resulting estimate of C i;n a signature.
The model selection in 7] is consistent with the usual data mining paradigm of nding a model with high coverage and support, but there are three important di erences. First, it does not require that each customer in the training set have both fraud and non-fraud tra c. Thus, even if fraud is relatively rare, it is possible to have a huge training set of customers to model legitimate behavior. A huge set is critical to the success of a fraud detection algorithm because the false alarm rate in the eld will be grossly underestimated if the diversity of calling patterns in the training data is too small. Second, the statistical approach does not require that calls for each customer be separated into fraud and non-fraud. This is important because labelled calls can be nearly impossible to obtain. Many fraud cases are not settled by a call-by-call resolution because that kind of review is too costly. Even if the service provider does review each call with a customer, the resulting information is often not kept with the call data or in the fraud management center. Requiring labelled calls severely restricts the number of customers in the training data, which again may lead to too narrow a view of the variability in fraud. Third, the method in 7] takes into account the average behavior for the customer, the variability in the customer behavior, and the uncertainty in the tted model for each customer. Ignoring that variability and uncertainty is likely to lead to over-optimism.
Given a signature for a customer, the next task is to de ne a way to update it with every new call that the customer makes that is not judged to be suspicious. Call-by-call updating limits processing to those accounts for which there are calls and avoids the need to retrieve past calls from a database, which is inevitably slow. (It also enables call-by-call fraud detection.) In the statistics literature, incremental updating is called sequential estimation, and it has a long history. Perhaps the most common sequential estimation method, one that is equally familiar to engineers, is exponentially weighted moving averaging. For example, suppose the variable of interest is represented by a standard, xed bin histogram, the current histogram has estimated bin probabilities of p i;n after call n, and call n + 1 is represented by a vector Z i;n+1 that is zero in every bin except the one that contains the observed value for call n + 1. Then the updated bin probabilities are p i;n+1 = (1 ? w)p i;n + wZ i;n+1 ; where 0 < w < 1 is a weight that controls how fast old calls are aged out, in the sense of having little in uence on the current estimate. The larger w, the more quickly the estimate can adapt to changes in a customer's calling pattern, but the more variable the estimate, because the e ective sample size is smaller.
Although it is as not well-known, there are variants of exponentially weighted moving averages that can be used to sequentially update quantiles, or the endpoints of an equi-depth histogram 6]. Variants for top-seller kinds of histograms are considered in 14], for example. Note, however, that the goal is to estimate the current predictive distribution, not the distribution of all the past calls for the customer in the database.
Initializing a Signature
Many sequential estimators require an initial value to start. Initialization has been considered extensively in the data mining and statistics literature under the guise of customer segmentation. That is, each customer is classi ed into a segment, and each segment has a representative signature that is used to represent anyone in the segment. The goal is to nd a small number of homogeneous groups so that the representative signatures are di erent for the di erent groups, but using the representative signature for anyone in the group leads to as little loss of information as possible.
There are two di erences between signature initialization and customer segmentation, though. First, each element of the signature is initialized separately. In a sense, each customer belongs to many segments, one for each component of the signature. Or, in another sense, each customer is assigned to a segment that is a product of all the signature components. The product representation is justi ed because all the relevant dependencies in variables were retained when the signature was de ned in the model building stage. Note that initializing each signature component separately gives a huge number of possible customer segments (or products of signature components), some of which were not observed in the training set. Only the components of the segmentation, not the product itself, need to have been observed previously.
The second di erence between our initialization and the usual segmentation strategy is that customers are allowed to evolve to their own segments over time. That is, the customer's calling signature is updated with each unsuspicious call that the customer makes, so an established customer gradually moves away from its initial segment to a personalized segment. Thus, each established customer has its own, personalized \segment-of-one".
Finally, once there is a way to estimate each customer's calling pattern, scoring calls is only a matter of comparing the probability of the call under the caller's estimated distribution to its probability under a fraud distribution. Scoring accounts is then a matter of combining call scores. More details on initialization and account scoring are given in 7].
Evaluating a Fraud Detection System
In principle, evaluating the performance of a fraud detection system is easy. Take a set of calls for a set of customers, some of whom have some fraudulent tra c and some who have only legitimate calls, run the fraud detection algorithm on the data, and record the fraction of fraud cases correctly detected by the algorithm and the fraction of legitimate cases that are mislabelled as fraud. But, it turns out that that kind of simulated performance has little to do with eld performance.
Here are a few of the problems.
False alarm rate Typically, everyone, including statisticians, computes the false alarm rate as the fraction of accounts in the population that have no fraud but are mislabelled as fraud. But, many fraud management centers compute only the fraction of investigated accounts that are mislabeled as fraud. Since most accounts in the population never experience fraud, the fraction of investigated accounts that are mislabeled as fraud is much higher than the fraction of accounts in the population that might have been labelled as fraud. Typically, the service provider is not interested in the fraction of all accounts that might have been mislabelled as fraud but were not, because only cases that are investigated have any real meaning ( nancial e ect). Thus, reported false alarm that uses the number of legitimate accounts in the population as the denominator is misleading. Instead, a richer detection model that takes into account the process for deciding which cases to investigate is needed.
Dynamic detection Often, fraud detection is an ongoing process, with cases that have yet to be investigated sitting in a queue. The highest ranking cases are opened, and those that sit at the bottom of the queue long enough may eventually be dropped without being investigated. How many cases are opened and which cases are opened depends on the resources that the service provider devotes to investigating cases and the severity of the fraud. Severity may depend on information that is not available in the call records. For example, fraud on a new account may or may not be deemed more serious than fraud on an established account, but the age of an account is often not known from the call records. Whether a case is investigated also depends on the other cases are in the queue, but that interdependency is usually ignored when performance is reported.
Time to detection Most service providers want to detect fraud as soon as it happens. It is not enough to estimate the fraction of fraud cases in the training data that are identi ed by the end of the period; it is also important to estimate the mean time to detection, or several quantiles of the time to detection to capture the variability in time to detection. Moreover, the loss from a fraud cases depends not just on the probability of detection but also on the number of calls or number of calling minutes that pass before fraud is detected (either queued for an investigator or opened by an investigator.) That is, clock time is not the only useful measure of time to detection.
Mislabelled cases Typically, the fraud cases do not include all the fraud on a network because some cases escape detection for months. Typically, service providers cannot give more than 60 or 90 days of historical data, so inevitably there are missing fraud cases. These cases tend not to be a random sample of all fraud cases, but a mixture of those that are overlooked because they are small and those that are overlooked because the fraudster is exceptionally clever. Ignoring the severity and nature of fraud in the training data paints an unrealistic picture of performance.
Unrealistic Training Sets In some cases, training sets have been assumed to have substantially more fraud than occurs in practice. This gives optimistic performance estimates. For example, if there are only two cases of fraud a day on average, and the service provider opens twenty cases and nds one of the cases of fraud, then the detection rate for that day is 50% and the false alarm rate is 95%, as far as the service provider is concerned. If a simulation assumes that 1/3 of all accounts experience fraud that day, then the reported performance will be much better. There are some procedures for extrapolating from extreme stress (high levels of fraud) to more realistic levels of stress in the statistics literature, but whether they have any use in estimating the performance of fraud detection systems is unknown. In any case, performance evaluation is not simple, and simplistic estimates are not useful.
Final Thoughts
Obviously, computing is critical to the analysis of massive data, especially when realtime performance is required. There is also a need for database management systems that allow more than rudimentary ways to explore data. Most statisticians manage data by extracting what they need from a database, applying tools like awk and perl to the selected data to reduce or aggregate the data further, and then analyzing the reduced or partially analyzed data in a statistical environment like S. This works, but it is not convenient.
Scaleable algorithms are needed, too, but the ability to informally explore data and tted models conveniently is more fundamental.
Massive data raise many questions beyond analysis that could be much better addressed by statisticians and computer scientists together than by either group working along. For example, there is growing concern about protecting the con dentiality of the massive data collected in log les on the internet. Con dentiality has been discussed in the statistics literature for decades, but most of the proposals that statisticians have made are not feasible for large sets of data. Or, their feasibility has not been demonstrated. Data cleaning is another area of common interest. The National Institute of Statistical Sciences is sponsoring a workshop with participants from both the computer science and statistics communities. Perhaps that collaboration will lead to new approaches to validating data.
Statistics has traditionally had strong ties to mathematics, both for designing new methodology and evaluating the performance of methods. Mathematics continues to be important to the analysis of massive sets of data. Probability is fundamental to every step in statistical modeling. Take away probability, and there is not much left to the approach to fraud detection described in Section 3. Probability also plays a role in computing. It is basic to the design and performance of MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo), for example, which is the workhorse of Bayesian model tting.
Other branches of mathematics that are important to understanding massive data include optimization, Bayesian networks, coding, compression, approximation theory, functional analysis, and algebra. So, just as extracting information is not just computing, it is not just computing together with statistics. There is much to learn from many sources.
